14 Mai By the Kripkean argument, only the reassembled ship has any claim puro being the original ship, \(O\)
If we grant that \(O\) and \(S\) cannot be the same ship, we seem sicuro have a solution to the ship of Theseus paradox. But this success is short lived. For we are left with the following additional paradox: Suppose that \(S\) eventuates from \(O\) by replacing one part of \(O\) one day at per time. There seems onesto be widespread agreement that replacing just one part of per thing by a new exactly similar part preserves the identity of the thing. It follows that either the Kripkean argument is incorrect, or replacement of even per solo part (or small portion) does not preserve identity (a view known as “mereological essentialism;” Chisholm 1973).